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Over the last few years, several states (chiefly Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, and more recently Maharashtra, Delhi and Orissa) have embarked in programmes of digitalization of the PDS, as the National E-Governance Plan prescribes. However, the uniqueness of the Kerala experience lies in a combination of two points: first, its timing, which was one of the earliest in the nation (user data digitization started in 2001) and coincided, as noted below, with the reconstruction of the system after targeting. Second, its comprehensive nature, articulated (as of Section 3) in a modular structure that extends digitalization to all the four core functions of the PDS. Among other states, timing and comprehensiveness made the PDS in Kerala a prominent case to illuminate the dynamics of ICTbased food security.
In the current Indian context, two facts may result in structural changes to the programme: the first one is the diffusion of Aadhar, the nationwide system of biometric identification that states may integrate in the PDS (UIDAI, 2009). The second one is implied by approval of the NFSA, which will restructure the PDS towards a return to quasi-universality of the programme. were based on the universality of PDS, and on its capability to serve the population in its quasientirety.
In a country where the transition to capitalism has occurred through a "passive revolution" (Chatterjee, 1986) , the history of Kerala is sui generis, in that it has witnessed a social transition from below: the class agency of rural peasants was key to subverting feudal relations of production (Heller, 1995). Kerala's political history, characterized by strong popular participation, was instrumental in generating the current, atypical development outcomes: sustained public action led to high social development, but at the same time, the imperative of redistribution may have acted as an obstacle to economic growth (Véron, 2001). Since independence, the imperative of redistribution constituted a key pillar of Kerala politics, and this led governments to take the PDS very seriously: furthermore, starting from 1965, ration shops were supervised by People's Food Committees, which would closely control the accountability of local retailers (Mooij, 1998). The combination of governmental care and people's participation was instrumental in the success of the universal distribution system.
The 1997 shift had major consequences on Kerala. As a result of the new food policy, a previously well-functioning system was led to a factual collapse: as 25% of the population was identified as BPL by the Planning Commission, allocation of foodgrains to the state, in the targeted system, was reduced to less than 10% of the previous supply (Swaminathan, 2002, p. 51). The state government, reestimating poverty incidence, identified 42% of the population as BPL, and provided food subsidy to the additional households from the state budget: even so, the sudden drop in supply of subsidized commodities had severe negative implications on the state-level PDS, which started encountering diverse kinds of issues.
Problems faced by the newly targeted system affect both the demand and the supply side. First, targeting caused a massive drop in the demand for PDS goods: with the minimization of subsidy (see Table 1 [ Table 1 here]
First, there are leakages after foodgrains leave the godown and before they reach the fair price shop. Secondly, there are leakages between the FPS and the customers. Any observer of the PDS knows that the major proportion of leakages belong to the former category, and the latter accounts for only a small proportion". 23 In fact, according to the estimates in point, Kerala's rates of diversion from the PDS are among the lowest in all India. This is ascribed to the high levels of public vigil and community monitoring that feature in the state.
However, comparison with the rest of India should not lead to downplay the consequences of diversion, which still remains the main cause preventing beneficiaries from access to subsidized goods.
